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Abstract
A fast consistency prover is a consistent poly-time axiomatized theory
that has short proofs of the finite consistency statements of any other
poly-time axiomatized theory. Kraj´ıcˇek and Pudla´k proved in [5] that
the existence of an optimal propositional proof system is equivalent to
the existence of a fast consistency prover. It is an easy observation that
NP = coNP implies the existence of a fast consistency prover. The reverse
implication is an open question.
In this paper we define the notion of an unlikely fast consistency prover
and prove that its existence is equivalent to NP = coNP.
Next it is proved that fast consistency provers do not exist if one
considers RE axiomatized theories rather than theories with an axiom set
that is recognizable in polynomial time.
1 Introduction
There are many interesting relations between computational complexity and
arithmetic. In this paper we shall focus on one such relation that involves
length of proofs of finite consistency statements. In particular, we shall study
fast consitstency provers. Basically a fast consistency prover, a facop for short,
is a certain theory S that has short proofs of the finite consistency statements
of any other certain theory T . We shall see precise definitions shortly.
Kraj´ıcˇek and Pudla´k proved in [5] that if there is no fast consistency prover,
then NP 6= coNP. We shall plead that it is very unlikely that a facop can exist.
It is an open question whether the existence of a facop is actually equivalent
to NP = coNP. In Section 4 we shall define the notion of an unlikely fast
consistency prover, a ufacop for short, and show that the existence of a ufacop
is equivalent to NP = coNP.
1This paper is partly written while employed at the Mathematical Institute of the Academy
of Sciences of the Czech Republic in Prague. The stay in Prague was also financed by the
Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).
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Before we shall plead that the existence of a facop is unlikely, let us first
specify some definitions. In this paper, we shall always mean by the length of a
proof the number of symbols occurring in it. If S is a theory, we shall denote by
S ⊢n ϕ that ϕ is provable in S by a proof whose length does not exceed n. We
shall denote the formalization/arithmetization of this statement by PrS(n, pϕq).
For those familiar with formalized provability it is good to stress that there is
a logarithm involved here, that is,
PrS(x, y) := ∃π ( |π|≤x ∧ ProofS(π, y)).
Here ProofS(x, y) is a natural arithmetization of “x is the Go¨del number of a
proof in S of a formula with Go¨del number y”. All theories considered in this
paper will be first order theories of some minimal strength which are sound and
hence consistent. With ConT (x) we shall denote ¬PrT (x, p0 = 1q).
If a theory T has a set of axioms which is decidable/recognizable in polyno-
mial time, we shall speak of a poly-time theory. If ϕ is provable in S, we shall
denote by ||ϕ||S the length of the shortest proof in S of ϕ. If n is a natural
number, we shall denote by n denote its efficient (dyadic) numeral. We are now
ready to give the definition of a fast consistency prover.
Definition 1.1. A fast consistency prover (facop) is a consistent poly-time the-
ory S such that for any other consistent poly-time theory T there is a polynomial
p such that
||ConT (n)||S ≤ p(n).
Now, why is it hard to believe in the existence of a facop? First of all, let
us remark that a facop is well defined. As, by our assumption, T is consistent,
we first remark that ConT (n) is indeed true. But ConT (n) is also provable in
S. This is because there are at most 2n many proofs whose length are below n.
So, in S all this many proofs can be listed and combined with the observation
that none of these proofs is a proof of 0 = 1.
This brings us directly to the question of how a facop could possibly exist.
For, if T is completely arbitrary, what else can S do than just give the list of all
possible proofs and remark that none is a proof of 0 = 1. For T weaker than S
it seems conceivable that S can do some smart tricks and summarize this long
list. But, if T is a lot stronger than S it seems very strange that S would have
a short way of proving the finite consistency statements of T .
It is good to realize here that the poly-time axiomatizability is not directly
saying anything about the proof strength of a theory. For example, a poly-time
theory may contain an axiom Con(ZFC + “there exists a superhuge cardinal”)
or any other consistent large cardinal assumption that makes your head spin
round.
But it seems hard to relate proof strength to the length of proofs of finite
consistency statements. In Section 3 we shall define a hypothetical facop S (in
the proof of Theorem 3.1). This S consists of a very weak fragment of arithmetic
plus the assumption that some hypothetical propositional proof system only
proves tautologies. All these ingredients seem to have little to do with proof
strength.
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The most tempting way to prove the non-existence of facops is by using
diagonalization, that is, by using fixed points. In Section 6 we set up such an
approach for RE-facops. An RE-facop is obtained by replacing “poly-time” in
Definition 1.1 by “RE”. In particular we show that RE-facops do not exist.
It is good to mention here a result by Pudla´k. In [6] and [7] he proved that
for a large class of theories T , the ||ConT (n)||T can be bounded by a polynomial
in n.
In addition it is good to mention that questions about the length of proofs of
finite consistency statements have an interest on themselves, not related to com-
putational complexity. In particular they have a close relation to foundations
of mathematics and possible partial realizations of Hilbert’s program.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we provide the basic definitions that are needed further on in the
paper. Probably it is best to just skip this section and turn to it if necessary.
As mentioned in the introduction, in this paper we shall study a relation
between arithmetic and computational complexity. By choosing/tailoring the
arithmetic language in the right way there are straightforward correspondences.
For this reason we shall in this paper always consider theories in the language
of bounded arithmetic (see e.g. [2]). This language is an extension to the basic
language of arithmetic in that it contains symbols for the binary logarithm |x|
and for the function ω1(x). Here ω1(x) = 2
|x|2. From now on, all arithmetic
formulas in this paper will be in the language of bounded arithmetic.
We shall employ the usual hierarchy of bounded formulas in this paper.
Thus, ∆b0 is the class of of formulas (in the language of bounded arithmetic)
which contains all open formulas, and which which is closed under all boolean
connectives and under sharply bounded quantification. Here sharply bounded
quantification is quantification of the form ∀x≤|t| or ∃x≤|t|. Here, t is some
term in the language of bounded arithmetic that does not contain x as a variable.
Next, we define ∆b0 = Σ
b
0 = Π
b
0. The Σ
b
i+1 formulas are those obtained by
closing off the Πbi formulas under bounded existential quantification, boolean
connectives and sharply bounded universal and existential quantification. The
Πbi+1 formulas are defined dually. Bounded quantification is quantification of
the form ∀x≤t or ∃x≤t. Again, t is some term in the language of bounded
arithmetic that does not contain x as a variable.
The language is chosen in such a way that there is a close correspondence
between computational complexity classes and definable sets. We say that a
formula α(x) defines a set of natural numbers A if x ∈ A ⇔ N |= α(x). It is
not too hard to see the following correspondences.
A is ∆b0 definable ⇒ A ∈ P
A is Σb1 definable ⇔ A ∈ NP
A is Πb1 definable ⇔ A ∈ coNP
This correspondence is pretty straightforward and can be easily continued through
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all the bounded formula complexity classes by using oracles. Note that for the
complexity class P we have no equivalence. In order to get an equivalence some
non trivial mathematics has to be applied. In particular, as a consequence of
Buss’ Witnessing Theorems we have the following.
A is ∆b1(S
1
2) definable ⇔ A ∈ P
A formula is ∆b1(S
1
2 ) if it is in S
1
2 equivalent to both a Σ
b
1 formula and a Π
b
1 for-
mula. Here, S12 is a pretty weak arithmetic theory with other than the defining
axioms of the symbols of the language of arithmetic a weak form of induction
for Σb1 formulas. We refer the reader to [2] for details. In the rest of this paper
we shall often speak of ∆b1(S
1
2) theories instead of poly-time theories.
We have seen one correspondence between arithmetic and complexity by the
above definability results. Another correspondence goes via propositional proof
systems as introduced by Cook and Reckhow in [3]. Let us briefly give the basic
definitions and facts here.
Definition 2.1. A propositional proof system, a pps for short, is a poly-time
mapping from the set of all strings onto the set of all tautologies.
All propositional proof systems we know, be it natural deduction, Gentzen
or whatever, can be seen as a pps by mapping a string of syntax that is not a
proof in this particular system to the tautology 1 and by mapping a string that
is a proof to the tautology it proves. Checking whether a string is a proof or
not is for all known proof systems poly-time (even cubic time would suffice, as
to get parsing of contex-free grammars).
An easy correspondence between propositional proof systems and complexity
is given by Theorem 2.3 which is due to Cook and Reckhow and relates the
existence of so-called super proof systems to NP = coNP.
Definition 2.2. A pps P is called super if there is a polynomial p such that
∀Tautτ ∃ |π|<p(|τ |) P (π, τ).
Theorem 2.3. NP = coNP if and only if there exists a super pps.
It is important to compare different pps’s to each other in terms of the size,
i.e. length of the proofs, which is nothing but the total number of symbols
occurring in it. If π is a proof, we shall denote its length by |π|. This suggests a
logarithmic relation which is good: the length of a string over a finite alphabet
is, under efficient coding, linear in the binary logarithm of the code of that
string.
Definition 2.4. Let P and Q be pps’s and let f be a function. We define:
- P ≥f(x) Q := Q(π, τ)→ ∃π
′ (|π′| ≤ f(|π|) ∧ P (π′, τ))
- P ≥ Q := for some polynomial p, P ≥p(x) Q. In this case we say
that P polynomially simulates Q.
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- P ≡ Q := (P ≥ Q) & (Q ≥ P )
Throughout this paper we shall assume that our binding polynomials are
monotone increasing which is not an essential assumption, but makes the proofs
easier.
In all known propositional proof systems it holds that the tautology is at
most as long as the proof of the tautology. This does not follow from the general
definition of a pps. However, the following lemma tells us that we, for many
purposes, may assume without loss of generality that, indeed, the proof of a
tautology is at most as long as the tautology.
Lemma 2.5. For every pps P , there is a pps P ′ such that P ′ ≡ P and
P ′(π, τ)→ |τ | ≤ |π|.
Proof. From P we define P ′ as
P ′(π′, τ) :⇔ [π′ = (πaτ)] ∧ P (π, τ)
where a denotes concatenation. Clearly P ≥x P
′. If now P (π, τ), we can
retrieve τ from π in poly-time, so, certainly |τ | ≤ p′(π) for some polynomial p′.
Consequently, |πaτ | ≤ p(π) for some polynomial p and P ′ ≥ P .
We shall often identify a pps and its ∆b1(S
1
2) definition in bounded arithmetic.
The following definition is central to the rest of this paper.
Definition 2.6. A pps P is an optimal propositional proof system, an opps
for short, if P ≥ Q for any propositional proof system Q.
It is easy to see that a pps is optimal whenever it is super. Thus via Cook
and Reckhow’s theorem (Theorem 2.3) we get that
NP = coNP⇒ there exists an opps.
It is an open question whether the converse implication holds.
3 Fast consistency provers and optimal propo-
sitional proof systems
Kraj´ıcˇek and Pudla´k proved that the existence of an opps is equivalent to the
existence of a facop. In this section we shall give a self contained version of this
proof. The next section will then build forth on this proof to obtain a similar
result.
Theorem 3.1. ∃ facop ⇐⇒ ∃ opps
Before we can present a proof of this theorem, we should first mention some
results involving length of proofs and discuss some coding machinery.
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Definition 3.2. A relation R is polynomially numerable in a theory T if for
some polynomial p and some formula ρ we have that
R(x) ⇔ T ⊢ ρ(x) ⇔ T ⊢p(|x|) ρ(x).
It is good to stress here that x denotes the efficient numeral of x so that the
length of x is logarithmic in x.
Theorem 3.3. The following are equivalent.
1. R ∈ NP
2. R is polynomially numerable in robinson’s arithmetic R
Proof. A proof of this theorem can be found in [8]. The ⇐ is easy and actually
holds for any poly-time axiomatized theory T .
The⇒ direction goes by coding of computations on Turing machines. To get
really as low as R here, some additional tricks with definable cuts are needed.
If R ∈ NP, it is definable by a Σ (even Σb1) formula ρ and thus, for any
(sound, poly-time axiomatized) theory T extending Q we have that
R is polynomially numerable by ρ in Q ⇔
R is polynomially numerable by ρ in T
Having this in mind, we can consider provable Σb1-completeness as expressed in
the next theorem as a formalization of the above (Theorem 3.3 plus remark).
Theorem 3.4. Let T be a ∆b1(S
1
2) theory extending S
1
2 . For every Σ
b
1 formula
σ(x), there is a polynomial p such that
S12 ⊢ ∀x (σ(x)→ PrT (p(|x|), pσ(x˙)q)).
Coding of syntax for propositional logic in arithmetic can be done in a stan-
dard way. If a˜ is a sequence of zeroes and ones and ϕ(~p) a propositional formula,
there is a ∆b1(S
1
2) formula saying that ϕ(pi/(a˜)i) evaluates to one. We shall write
a˜ |= ϕ.
There is a Πb1 formula Taut(τ) saying that Taut(p0, . . . , pn) is a tautology. This
formula is defined as
Taut(τ) := ∀ |a|≤(n+1) a˜ |= τ.
If Q is a pps, we shall denote by RFN(Q) the formalized reflection over Q, that
is, the following ∀Πb1 formula saying that all provable formulas are true.
RFN(Q) := ∀τ (∃π Q(π, τ)→ Taut(τ))
In a sense, we can even code arithmetic (and a fortiori syntax) into propo-
sitional logic. This is expressed in the following lemma.
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Lemma 3.5. There exists a translation of Πb1-formulas ϕ(x) in the language of
bounded arithmetic into series of propositional formulas ||ϕ||m such that:
1. The translation preserves the structure of ϕ. E.g., ||χ ∧ ψ||m = ||χ||m ∧
||ψ||m, where χ and ψ are subformulas of ϕ.
2. The translation ||ϕ||m contains variables ~q and p0, . . . , pm.
Instead of writing in the arithmetical correct way that ϕ is a tautology
when the binary representation a˜ is substituted for the pi, i.e.,
Taut(||ϕ||m(~q, ~p/a˜)),
we shall use the following shorthand notation.
a˜ |= ||ϕ||m
3. The translation is provably adequate in the following sense.
S12 ⊢ ∀ |a|≤(m+1) (ϕ(a)↔ a˜ |= ||ϕ||
m)
4. The translation is short in the following sense. For each ϕ there exists a
polynomial p such that
|(||ϕ||m)| ≤ p(m).
Note that ||ϕ||m and ||ϕ||T denote two completely different things. We are
confident that the reader can keep them apart. Now that all coding machinery
has been discussed, we are ready to present a proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. In this proof, we shall denote by T ⊢⋆ ϕ the statement
that ϕ is provable in T by a proof whose length is bounded by some polynomial
on the (length of) the parameters of ϕ. Sometimes we shall have to specify the
parameters to keep the intended reading clear.
“⇒” We repeat the proof from [5], and [4] (Theorem 14.1.4). Let S be a
facop. We define P and show that P is an opps.
P (π, τ) := ProofS(π,Taut(τ)) or
(τ = 1 and π is not a proof in S of Taut(τ ′) for any τ ′)
To see that P is an opps we fix some arbitrary Q and consider some π and τ
such that Q(π, τ). By Theorem 3.3 we get that
S12 ⊢⋆ Q(π, τ). (1)
We now define TQ := S
1
2 + RFN(Q). Clearly, by (1) and by RFN(Q) we get
TQ ⊢⋆ Taut(τ). Here, the ⋆ is still dependent on |π|. Once more, by Theorem
3.3 we get for some polynomial p that
S ⊢⋆ PrTQ(p(|π|), pTaut(τ)q). (2)
7
By Theorem 3.4, for some polynomial p′ we have that
S ⊢ ¬Taut(τ)→ PrTQ(p
′(|τ |), p¬Taut(τ)q). (3)
Combining (2) and (3) we get for some polynomial q that
S ⊢⋆ ¬Taut(τ)→ PrTQ(q(|π|), p0 = 1q)
or equivalently
S ⊢⋆ ConTQ(q(|π|))→ Taut(τ).
As S is a facop, we get S ⊢⋆ ConTQ(q(|π|)), whence S ⊢⋆ Taut(τ) and thus,
P ⊢ τ by a proof whose length is polynomial in |π|.
”⇐” Let P be an opps. We define
S := S12 + RFN(P )
and shall prove that S is a facop. So, let T be some ∆b1(S
1
2) theory. We should
see that ConT (x) has short proofs in S. For this purpose we define Q as follows.
Q := P + {||ConT (|x|)||
m | m < ω}
Note that, due to the logarithm, ConT (|x|) is indeed a Π
b
1 formula. As P is an
opps, we get by Item 4 of Lemma 3.5 that
P ⊢⋆ ||ConT (|x|)||
m.
Here, the ⋆ refers to polynomial in m. By Theorem 3.3 we get that
S12 ⊢⋆ ∃y P (y, ||ConT (|x|)||
m)
and consequently,
S ⊢⋆ Taut(||ConT (|x|)||
m).
In particular
S ⊢⋆ ∀ |a|≤(m+1) a˜ |= ||ConT (|x|)||
m.
For a = 2m we get via Item 3 from Lemma 3.5 that
S ⊢⋆ ConT (m).
In other words, for some polynomial p,
||ConT (m)||S ≤ p(m)
and, indeed, S is a facop.
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4 Unlikely fast consistency provers and unlikely
propositional proof systems
In the previous section we have studied facops. As a direct consequence of
Theorem 3.1 we get that
NP = coNP⇒ there exists a facop.
As mentioned before, the converse implication is an open question. In this
section we shall define a unlikely fast consistency prover, a ufacop for short,
which is a particular sort of facops. We shall then prove that the existence of a
ufacop is equivalent to NP = coNP.
In order to prove this, we shall have to employ a slightly different definition of
a pps. However, in the light of Lemma 2.5 this alteration is not really essential.
Definition 4.1. A pps P is a poly-time mapping from the set of all strings onto
the set of all tautologies such that P (π, τ) implies |τ | ≤ |π|.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no theorem concerning pps’s that does
not remain valid under this new definition.
Definition 4.2. An unlikely propositional proof system —an upps for short—
is a pps P such that for some polynomial p we have that
∀ppsQ P ≥p(x) Q.
Theorem 4.3. ∃ upps ⇐⇒ ∃ super pps ⇐⇒ coNP = NP
Proof. By a basic Theorem 2.3 we know that ∃ super pps ⇔ coNP = NP. We
relate the existence of an upps to the existence of a super pps by actually proving
that P is an upps ⇔ P is super.
“⇒” Let P be an upps with corresponding polynomial p. It follows that P
is super. For, let τ be some tautology. Then2
P ≥p(x) P + τ, whence P ⊢p(|τ |) τ.
“⇐” Let P be super with corresponding polynomial p. Then P is also an
upps. For, let Q be an arbitrary pps. If Q(π, τ), then, by our assumption on
pps’s, we see that |τ | ≤ |π|. As P is super, we can find π′ with P (π′, τ) and
|π′| ≤ p(|τ |). By monotonicity of p, clearly |π′| ≤ p(|π|) and we see that P
indeed is an ufacop.
2There is a subtle technicality here as to the representation of P + τ . It is tempting to
define the mapping P + τ (remember, a proof system is a mapping) to be the identity on τ .
By definition P was defined on τ too. The value of P (τ) should now be given on some other
input, etc. We shall not go into the details of this coding here and assume some canonical
representation.
9
It is only in this proof (proof of Theorem 4.3) that we need the assumption
on an upps P that P (π, τ) implies |π| ≤ |τ |.
We shall relate uppses to ufacops –unlikely fast consistency provers– which
are an adaptation of facop’s. Basically, the idea is that a ufacop is a uniform
version of a facop. That is, we swap quantifiers. For a facop S there is, for any
poly-time theory T , a polynomial p such that ||ConT (n)||S ≤ p(n).
If we would simply define a ufacop S to be such that there is a polynomial
p such that for any poly-time theory T we have ||ConT (n)||S ≤ p(n), it would
be easy to see that there are no ufacops. This is because the axiomatization of
T could be very very long, so that the length of ConT (n) cannot be bounded.
So, we define a measure of the complexity of T that will go into the definition
of a ufacop.
Definition 4.4. If R is a relation that is decidable in time O(|x|l) we shall call
l the decision exponent of R and write l = DecExp(R).
If T is a theory with a poly-time decidable set of axioms, we denote by
DecExp(T ) the decision exponent of the set of axioms of T .
Definition 4.5. An unlikely fast consistency prover, a ufacop for short, is a
∆b1(S
1
2) axiomatizable theory S such that there is a polynomial p such that
∀∆
b
1(S
1
2)T ∀x ||ConT (x)||S ≤ p(x
l).
Here, l := DecExp(T ).
Before we shall relate uppses to ufacops we first need some additional obser-
vations on coding techniques.
Lemma 4.6. If R is a poly-time relation with DecExp(R) = l, then there is a
series of propositional formulas ρn such that for some polynomial independent
of R we have
1. a ∈ R ⇔ a˜ |= ρn for |a|≤(n+1),
2. |ρn| = O(p(n
l)).
Proof. It is well known that a relation R which is decidable in time O(nl), has
circuits Cn of size linear in time× space. Clearly, the space is bounded by the
time, yielding O(n2l) = O((nl)2). The circuits can be translated in the standard
way to propositional formulas which are not much larger than the circuits. All
this scaling by coding techniques can be collected in a polynomial p.
From this lemma it follows that for any ∆b1(S
1
2 ) relation R, there is an l
′
such that ∀n |ρn| ≤ p(n
l′) for the ρn and p as in the lemma above. For the
sake of readability we shall assume that l = l′. Alternatively one could define
DecExp(R) to be this very l′.
Lemma 4.7. Let T be a theory with a poly-time set of axioms with DecExp(T ) =
l. There is a translation 〈|·|〉
m
of specific Πb1 formulas into series of propositional
formulas such that there is a fixed (independent of T ) polynomial q such that
|(〈|ConT (|x|)|〉
m
)| ≤ q(ml).
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Proof. The formula ConT (|x|) says ∀ |y|<|x| ¬ProofT (y, p0 = 1q). Here,
ProofT (y, p0 = 1q) is as always saying that y is a sequence (a proof) where
some entries are axioms of T . We translate the ∆b1(S
1
2) formula AxiomsT (x)
using Lemma 4.6 and the rest in the structural way as mentioned in Lemma
3.5.
Note that this translation 〈| · |〉
m
still has all the structural properties as
mentioned in Lemma 3.5. We shall in the sequel refrain from distinguishing
〈| · |〉
m
and || · ||m.
Theorem 4.8. The following are equivalent.
1. ∃ ufacop
2. ∃ upps
3. ∃ super pps
4. coNP = NP
Proof. In the light of Theorem 4.3, we only need to concentrate on 1. First we
show that 1 ⇒ 3 and then we shall show that 2 ⇒ 1.
“1 ⇒ 3” Suppose S is a ufacop. We define PS as follows:
PS(π, τ) := ProofS(π,Taut(τ)) or
(τ = 1 and π is not a proof in S of Taut(τ ′) for any τ ′)
We shall show that PS is super. Our proof is a simplification of the proof of
the analog of this implication in Theorem 3.1. Moreover, we keep track of the
explicit polynomials here.
Via Theorem 3.4 we get a polynomial q(x) such that
S ⊢ ∀x (¬Taut(x)→ PrS12 (q(|x|), p¬Taut(x˙)q)) ⇔
S ⊢ ∀x (¬Taut(x)→ ∃π (|π|<q(|x|) ∧ ProofS12 (π, p¬Taut(x˙)q))) ⇒
S ⊢ ∀x (¬Taut(x)→ ∃π (|π|<q′(|x|) ∧ ProofS12+Taut(x˙)(π, p0 = 1q)))
for some polynomial q′ not so different from q ⇒
S ⊢ ∀x (∀π (|π|<q′(|x|)→ ¬ProofS12+Taut(x˙)(π, p0 = 1q))→ Taut(x)) ⇒
S ⊢ ∀x (ConS12+Taut(x˙)(q
′(|x|))→ Taut(x)) (†)
Now, as S is an ufacop, there is a polynomial p such that
||ConS12+Taut(τ)(q
′(|τ |))||S ≤ p((q
′(|τ |))l) (††)
where l = DecExp(S12 + Taut(τ)). Combining (†) and (††) we get that
S ⊢p′(|τ |l) Taut(τ)
for some polynomial p′. Note that p′ and q′ are independent of τ . To conclude
our argument we only need to see that l = DecExp(S12 +Taut(τ)) is independent
of τ .
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However, to check whether x is an axiom of S12 + Taut(τ), we have to check
whether x is an axiom of S12 or whether x = Taut(τ) which is linear in |x| (and
so are the corresponding circuits). So, indeed, l is independent on τ and PS is
super.
“2 ⇒ 1” So, we now prove ∃ upps ⇒ ∃ ufacop. Suppose that P is an upps
with corresponding polynomial p. We claim that
S := S12 + RFN(P )
is an ufacop. To see this, we consider an arbitrary ∆b1(S
1
2) axiomatized theory
T with l = DecExp and estimate ||ConT (n)||S . The theory T will be related to
P by defining
Q := P + {||ConT (|x|)||
m | m < ω}.
Note that, as we have a logarithm, indeed, ConT (|x|) is a Π
b
1 formula and by
Lemma 4.7 we get that
|(||ConT (|x|)||
m)| ≤ q(ml)
for some polynomial q independent of T . As P is an upps we get
P ⊢p(q(ml)) ||ConT (|x|)||
m.
By Theorem 3.3 we get some polynomial r, independent of T such that
S ⊢r(ml) ∃y P (y, ||ConT (|x|)||
m).
As S contains RFN(P ), we can perform the following reasoning inside S. Note
that the reasoning is uniform and not depending on particular properties of T
other than l.
(⋆)
∃y P (y, ||ConT (|x|)||
m) ⇒ by RFN(P )
Taut(||ConT (|x|)||
m) ⇒ by definition of Taut
∀ |a|≤(m+1) a˜ |= ||ConT (|x|)||
m ⇒
2˜m |= ||ConT (|x|)||
m ⇒ by Lemma 3.5, Item 3
ConT (m)
(⋆⋆)
As we mentioned, this reasoning is not dependent on T other than via
|(||ConT (|x|)||
m)| and |ConT (m)|. Lemma 4.7 takes care of the first. For the
second, we shall use and assumption, namely that |ConT (m)| is not much larger
than t(|m|l) for some polynomial t independent of T . This is not a strange
assumption.
When formalizing mathematics, at some stage, one should often exclude
some pathological codings. In our case, |ConT (m)| is only dependent on |AxiomsT (x)|.
By coding the small circuit that decides whether a number is a code of an axiom
(see Lemma 4.6) in arithmetic, we get a short way of writing AxiomsT (x).
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If we put no restrictions on the way AxiomsT (x) is represented, it might very
well consist of 1010
99
conjunctions of the short representation. One can even
think of worse pathological codings.
Under our assumption, indeed, the reasoning between (⋆) and (⋆⋆) can be
performed in S in a uniform way, whence for some polynomial p′ independent
of T we get that
S ⊢p′(ml) ConT (m).
In other words ||ConT (m)||S ≤ p
′(ml) and S is indeed a ufacop.
Question 4.9. Under the assumption that NP 6= coNP, is there an oracle rela-
tivized to which there is a facop which is not an ufacop?
It is clear that if the answer to this question is positive, then the existence
of an opps really is (conditionally) weaker than NP = coNP. Buhrman et al.
gave in [1] an oracle under which no pps and a fortiori no facop does exist.
Verbitsky gave in [9] an oracle such that optimal proof systems exist, however
still NE 6= coNE, whence coNP 6= NP.
5 Lower bounds for facops
Of course, having an equivalence of NP=coNP to the existence of a ufacop does
not directly help to attack this problem: hard problems are never solved by
reformulating them. As expected, problems related to ufacops and facops are
likely to be extremely difficult.
For example, it is not even known of specific weak theories like, for example,
S12 or even Robinson’s arithmetic Q that they are not a facop. In this section we
shall present and reprove some well known results which are the best lower bound
results known when it comes to facops. Friedman and Pudla´k independently
have shown the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1. For every poly-time axiomatizable theory T extending S12 , there
is a number 0 < ǫ < 1 such that
nǫ < ||ConT (n)||T .
Proof. The proof can also be found in [8]. Our proof is a bit sketchy. More
details shall be given in Lemma 6.1 where the proof is milked further.
The proof proceeds by considering a fixed point δ(x) satisfying the following
equivalence.
T ⊢ δ(x)↔ ¬PrT (x, pδ(x˙)q)
Now, we reason in T .
Suppose T ⊢x δ(x), then, by Theorem 3.4, for some polynomial f we get
T ⊢f(x) PrT (x, pδ(x)q). This yields, combining with properties of the fixed-
point, that T ⊢g(x) 0 = 1, for some function g(x) = O(f(x) + x+ log(x)
O(1)).
By contraposition we get that
ConT (g(x))→ ¬PrT (x, pδ(x˙)q) (4)
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Here ends our reasoning inside T . Note that, as δ was externally given, the f
and g in this reasoning are actually also externally given.
Now, as T is consistent, we get from (4) that ¬PrT (x, pδ(x˙)q), whence
||δ(x)||T > x. It is reasonable to assume that x = O(f(x)), whence g(x) =
O(f(x)).
Again, using the provable fixed point properties of δ(x) we obtain from (4)
that
||ConT (g(x))→ δ(x)||T = log(x)
O(1)
whence
||ConT (g(x))||T ≥ ||δ(x)||T − log(x)
O(1) ≥ x− log(x)O(1).
As g(x) = O(f(x)) we get that (the inverses of polynomials on positive numbers
exist from a certain point on) for x large enough
||ConT (x)||T ≥ ||ConT (g
−1(g(x)))||T
≥ ||ConT (f
−1(g(x)))||T
≥ f−1(x− log(x)O(1))
≥ xǫ.
Here, 1
ǫ
is about the size of the degree of f , whence 0 < ǫ < 1.
5.1 Variations
Most likely, it is possible to use any variation of the proof of Go¨del’s second
incompleteness theorem to get Theorem 5.1. In particular, one can consider the
proof that uses a fixed point of
δ(x)↔ PrT (x, p¬δ(x˙)q).
Again, it is easy to see that T ⊢x ¬δ(x) yields a contradiction. An extra
application of reflection is needed to show that T 0x δ(x).
It is also possible to run the same argument with the following fixed point.
δ(x)↔ ¬PrT (h(x), pδ(x˙)q)
Of course, the representation of h should not block the provable completeness
for Σ01 (or ∃Σ
b
1) sentences that is needed in the argument. The function h must
thus be Σ01 representable. In other words, h should be a recursive function. In
the light of Question ??, this fixed point only makes things worse.
However, this fixed point gives rise to true statements with very long proofs.
This shall be exploited later on. Therefore it is worth while to restate some
easy properties of this fixed point. We shall require that h be some provably
unbounded (that is, goes provably to infinity) recursive function.
Fact 5.2. Let S be a sound theory and δ such that S ⊢ δ(x)↔ ¬PrS(h(x), pδ(x˙)q).
Then,
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1. ||δ(n)||S > h(n)
2. N |= ∀n δ(n)
3. ∀n S ⊢ δ(n)
4. S 0 ∀x δ(x)
These facts are pretty easy to verify. At 4 the provable unboundedness of h is
used to see that S ⊢ ∀x δ(x) ↔ Con(S). Now, using these facts, we can give
easy proofs of the following two well known propositions.
Proposition 5.3. For any recursive function h, there exists a series of provable
predicate logical tautologies ϕn of which the length of proofs in predicate logic
are not bounded by h(|ϕn|).
Proof. Take a strong enough finitely axiomatized arithmetic theory, for example
IΣ1. Consider
IΣ1 ⊢ δ(x)↔ ¬PrIΣ1(h(x), pδ(x˙)q).
Then
∧
IΣ1 → δ(n) suffices.
Proposition 5.4. There is an explicit series of provable predicate logical tau-
tologies ψn whose proofs are not bounded by any recursive function.
Proof. By diagonalization from Proposition 5.3.
6 RE facops do not exist
The existence of a facop or a ufacop is very counter-intuitive. However, as is to
be expected, every attempt to prove the non-existence fails. In this section we
shall present such an attempt by dropping the requirement that the theories for
which a facop should have short proofs be poly-time decidable.
So, in this section, we consider sound theories with an RE axiomatization.
For this class of theories we can show that there is no ”strongest theory” S
having short proofs for finite consistency statements of any other RE theory.
The final result is stated in Theorem 6.4. Actually the result is quite strong.
It says that for any theory S, there is a theory T whose proofs in S of its
consistency statements have non-recursive lengths.
The idea of the proof is by generalizing the proof of Theorem 5.1 and Fact
5.2. First we state a lemma that articulates some conditions on S and T under
which ||ConT (x)||S ≥ h(x). We have chosen S as to refer to slow. The next
two lemmata tell us how to construct, given an S, a theory T such that the
conditions hold.
Lemma 6.1. Let S and T be consistent RE theories containing S12 . Let δ(x)
be such that
S12 ⊢ ∀x (δ(x)↔ ¬PrS(h(x), pδ(x˙)q))
for a certain recursive h with h = Ω(x). Furthermore, let S and T be such that
T has speed-up over S in the following sense.
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(i) S ⊢h(x) δ(x) ⇒ T ⊢O(x) PrS(h(x), pδ(x)q),
(ii) S ⊢h(x) δ(x) ⇒ T ⊢O(x) δ(x).
Moreover, let (i) and (ii) be formalizable in S. Then it holds that
||ConT (x)||S ≥ h(O(x)).
Proof. Reason in S. Suppose that
S ⊢h(x) δ(x). (5)
Then, by Assumption (i), we get
T ⊢O(x) PrS(h(x), δ(x)). (6)
Combining (5) and (ii), we also get
T ⊢O(x) δ(x).
As the fixed point equation is also provable in T , i.e.
T ⊢O(1) ∀x (δ(x)↔ ¬PrS(h(x), pδ(x˙)q)),
we get
T ⊢O(x)+log(x)O(1) ¬PrS(h(x), pδ(x)q).
Combining this with (6) we obtain
T ⊢O(x)+log(x)O(1) 0 = 1.
We now no longer reason in S. Considering the above reasoning, together with
the fact that S is sound and T is consistent, we see that
||δ(x)||S ≥ h(x). (7)
Also, from the above reasoning, we have
S ⊢ PrS(h(x), δ(x)) → ¬ConT (g(x))
for some function g(x) = O(x + log(x)O(1)). Consequently also
S ⊢ ConT (g(x))→ δ(x) (↔ ¬PrS(h(x), δ(x))),
and we get that
||ConT (g(x))→ δ(x)||S = log(x)
O(1).
This implies
||ConT (g(x))||S ≥ ||δ(x)||S − log(x)
O(1).
Because g(x) = O(x) = O(h(x)), by (7) we obtain the required result, that is,
||ConT (x)||S ≥ h(O(x)).
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The next lemma provides an approach so that we can concentrate on Item (i).
Lemma 6.2. Let S and T be (sound & RE) such that
{∀~x (✷Sϕ(~˙x)→ ϕ(~x))} ⊆ The axioms of T
and that moreover (verifiably in S)
1. S ⊢h(x) δ(x)⇒ T ⊢O(x) PrS(h(x), δ(x))
for some fixed formula δ(x), then it holds (verifiably in S) that
S ⊢h(x) δ(x)⇒ T ⊢O(x) δ(x).
Proof. (Reason in S.) Suppose that S ⊢h(x) δ(x). Because of 1, we get that
T ⊢O(x) PrS(h(x), δ(x)),
hence also
T ⊢O(x) ✷Sδ(x).
Adding just one more line to the T -proof consisting of the axiom ✷Sδ(x)→ δ(x)
gets us the required
T ⊢O(x) δ(x),
as the number of symbols in ✷Sδ(x)→ δ(x) is just O(log(x)).
Note that this proof makes no further assumptions on the nature of δ(x).
For the particular δ(x) we are interested in, it would suffice to demand that
T ⊇ Con(S).
Lemma 6.3. Let S be a given sound & RE theory. Let S′ be defined so that its
axioms are precisely the theorems of S. Next, define T so that its axioms are
the axioms of S′ together with {∀~x (✷Sϕ(~˙x) → ϕ(~x))}. Then, S and T satisfy
(i) and (ii) of Lemma 6.1.
Proof. Note that S = S′, whence S′ and T are also sound RE theories. Reason
in S, and suppose that S ⊢h(x) δ(x). Then also S ⊢ PrS(h(x), δ(x)). Notice
that the length of PrS(h(x), δ(x)) is O(log(x)) so certainly O(x), whence
T ⊢O(x) PrS(h(x), δ(x)).
Lemma 6.2 now yields the desired result.
Note that the construction in Lemma 6.3 works simultaneously for all recur-
sive functions. Thus, putting things together, we have now shown the following
theorem, as announced at the beginning of this section.
Theorem 6.4. For any sound RE theory S there exists another sound RE
theory T for which for any recursive function h
||ConT (x)||S ≥ h(O(x)).
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Proof. For any such theory S, apply the construction as in Lemma 6.3 to obtain
a theory T so that Lemma 6.1 yields the required result.
Question 6.5. Can Theorem 6.4 also be proved for theories with a primitive re-
cursive set of axioms? Which is the weakest class of theories for which Theorem
6.4 can be proved?
7 Speculations on poly-time diagonalizations
Clearly, a theorem like Theorem 6.4 can not be proved in full generality for poly-
time theories. This is due to the observation we made before that ||ConT (x)||S ≤
f(x) for some f which is exponential in in x. Of course, this observation hinges
on the fact that it is poly-time decidable that an axiom of T is indeed an axiom
of T . And thus, by Theorem 3.3 the axiomhood has a short proof in S.
Having this in mind we immediately see why the proof of Theorem 6.4 does
not carry over to the setting of poly-time theories: If one starts out with a theory
S with a ∆b1(S
1
2) axiomatization, the trick in Lemma 6.3 will yield a genuinly
Σ01 axiomatized theory T .
One could think of defining the axioms of S consisting of those theorems
having a proof in some logarithmically short interval [a, b] which is not too far
away from the theorem. However, this is the same problem as we started with:
given a provable formula, look for a short proof.
The conditions in Lemma 6.1 are formulated in quite a general way. A more
promising way to obtain lower bounds for facops would be to look for other
fixed points such that given a theory S, one can define a theory T such that
conditions (i) and (i) of Lemma 6.1 are satisfied for this fixed point.
The following conjecture does not seem fully unfeasible.
Conjecture 7.1. For every sound ∆b1(S
1
2) theory S and for every l ∈ ω, there
exists a sound ∆b1(S
1
2 ) theory T such that
||ConT (x)||S > x
l.
It is clear that Conjecture 7.1 is a desirable result as it is just one step away
of the required
∃∆
b
1(S
1
2)S ∀∆
b
1(S
1
2)T ∀l ||ConT (x)||S > x
l.
And this last step suggests some compactness or diagonalization argument.
However, poly-time diagonalization seems to be the hard problem at the core
of the P 6= NP-problem.
We would like to conclude this paper by an easy but interesting observation.
Mathematical practice has proved that it is very hard to find strong lower bounds
for classical propositional logic. Actually the state of the art is still stuck at a
quadratic lower bound. The following observation might be an explanation for
this fact.
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Observation 7.2. If optimal proof systems do exist, then any poly-time rec-
ognizable sequence of tautologies has polynomially bounded proofs. Hence, if
moreover coNP 6= NP, any hard tautology is not poly-time recognizable in this
case.
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